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Developm ent of the Turkish Economy: An Experien ce in Planning
I.

BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this paper is twofold:

to evaluate the performa nce

of the Turkish economy during the years of plan impleme ntation, (i.e. from
the end of 1962 to 1971), and to assess the effectiv eness of planning in
Turkey in terms of the achievem ent of its objectiv es and its contribu tion
to economi c developm ent.

In evaluati ng the nature and directio n of develop 

ment, socio-ec onomic and politica l factors will also bJconsi dered.
Various features of the Turkish economy will be apparen t as the paper
unfolds . But some basic statisti cs on the Turkish economy are warrante d here.
Turkey had a populati on of 35.6 milljon in 1970, growing at an annual rate
of 2.6 percent .

Literacy is around 50 percent among the populat ion six years

old and over. Some 35 percent of the people live in urban centers with a
populat ion of 10,000 or more.

Nearly 70 percent of the labor force is en

gaged in agricul tural activiti es. The gross nationa l product of the country
grew annually at the rate of approxim ately 5 percent during the last two

i1

decades , reaching the level of -8'!'7 billion dollars in 1970, at the officia l
rate of exchang e.
of 230 dollars.

This correspo nded to a per capita gross nationa l product
On the other hand, in 1970 some 30 percent of the net do

mestic income originat ed from agricult ure while the shares of industry and
services were 20 and 50 percent respecti vely.

-2Total foreign trade of Turkey was on the order of 17 percent of her
gross national product in 1970.

The current account of Turkey's balance of

payments showed a deficit throughout the last two decades, roughly at the
level of 2 percent of Turkey's gross national product, indicating that there
has been a continuous resource transfer from abroad.

Hore than 80 percent

of Turkey's exports have been of agricultural origin, while only three crops
(tobacco, cotton, and hazelnuts) constitute more than 50 percent of the total
exports in value.
These statistics reveal the level of development of the Turkish economy,
and put her in the category of the so-called ''underdeveloped countries".
However, despite some similarities, Turkey's development experience differs
from that of the majority of the countries in this group.

Unlike the exper

ience of newly emerging countries, Turkey was never fully subjected to
colonial rule, even though in the later years of the Ottoman Empire Wes
tern powers exercised substantial influence and control over the country's
economy and resources.

One example of this domination was a series of con

cessions granted to foreigners and foreign operations, mainly in terms of
extra-territori al rights, better known as "capitulations" .
Another example was the operation of an agency made up of foreign credi
tors, called Ottoman Debt Administration, which had direct access to various
taxes and custom revenues.

Tt!rkey was forced to accept the establishment

of such an agency when the government could not repay the heavy debts in
curred by the Ottoman rulersto cover the budgetary deficits that resulted
mainly from costly military operation.

-3A second reason why the Turkish experience is unique is that compared
with most other contemporary underdeveloped countries, Turkey as a nation
made some noteworthy attempts to change the srructure of the society and to
achieve self-sustained economic development, as early as the 1920's. Once
a major political power, the Ottoman Empire later on fell behind the European
countries in technology, as well as in economic and social progress. Some
attempts were made in the last century to reform and modernize the old Em
pire.

However it was only after the establishment of the modern Turkish Re

public in 1923, which literally rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire,
that the most serious experiment of deliberately changing the socio-economic
structure of the country was initiated, under the leadership of Kemal Ata
turk.

Once national boundaries and the identity of the new Republic were

established, a number of social, cultural, and political reforms followed
rapidly with a view to modernize the country and eventually

11

catch up" with

the Western countries' standard of living.
Needless to say an elaboration he1·e of the various measures designed
to change Turkish society, under Ataturk 1 s leadership, is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the mention of a few of these reforms is illustrative.
To secularize the society, and break away from the traditional values
the sultanate and caliphate were abolished, religious schools were closed,
the Islamic legal system uas replaced by legal codes borrowed from European
countries, the Latin alphabet was adopted replacing the Arabic script.

An

international calendar, clock, and metric system were introduced. The re
forms even extended to wearing apparel; the traciitional fez was replaced by

-4the hat and European clothes. Women, once considere d secondary citizens,
were given the right to vote and equal opportuni ty in education and pro
fessions.
The new Republic inherited an economy that was financial ly exhausted as
a result of lengthy wars and mismanagement of resources . There was not an
industria l base to speak of, and the main services and commercia l activitie s
o1t,

were in the hands of either foreign companies .a£ minoritie s.

One major

concern of Ataturk was to remove the foreign control that infringed upon
the full sovereign ty of the country and to create an industria lized, self
sustained economy. To this end capitulat ions were terminate d, the Ottoman
debt Administ ration was abolished , and the foreign operation s were gradually
liquidate d. However, the revolutio naries did not have a definite strategy
or model for developin g the economy. As a result the earlier years of the
Republic was a period of trial and search for a suitable policy. First the
role of private enterpris e was stressed and the State assumed a secondary
role. But gradually it became more and more obvious that the private sector
was too small and ineffecti ve to industria lize the country.

In the early

1930's a major change was made in the official economic policy and emphasis
was shifted to the State.
This new policy was called "etatism 11 and sometimes as "state capitalism ".
Even though the concept evolved throughou t the time, the basic approach was
pragmatic and not ideologic al.

In order to achieve rapid industria lization

of the country the public sector entered the productio n process and national
plans were prepared to carry out investmen ts.

-sThe first five year industrialization plan was implemented in 1934-38.
Investments were made in factories, basically in consumer goods industries,
in mining, and in power projects. Emphasis was shifted to heavy industries
in the Second Five Year Plan which never got off the ground, however, on
account of the outbreak of the Second World War. Various plants established
in this period may not be able to withstand modern tests of efficiency, but
one should not overlook the fact that these projects were designed not only
from an economic point of view but also with the Purpose of demonstrating
modern technology in different parts of the country.

The existing railroads

were bought back from the foreign companies and new lines were added, linking
Meanwhile the industrial

remote parts of the country with major cities.

output rose sharply once the new plants started operating, the industrial
value added showing a two-fold increase from 1933 to 1938.
Even though Turkey was not actively involved in the Second W~rld War,
maintenance of a very large army put a heavy strain on the already weak
economy and production dropped visibly during the war years.

Immediately

after the war a number of events took place that were to have long lasting
effects on Turkey's economic and social life.

One of these was Turkey's

decision to establish closer links with the Western World and in particular
with the U.S. in political and military spheres.

This coincided with the

interest of the Western Bloc countries forthey attached great importance
to Turkey 1 s strategic geographic location. As a result, Turkey was one of
the earliest recipients of post-war foreign assistance. The second event
that has had significant influence in shaping the social and economic changes
in the following years was the decision made by Inonu, Ataturk's successor

-6upon the latter's death in 1938, to permit a multi-party system.
then a single-party system had prevailed in Turkey;

Until

members of Parliament

were also the members of the Republican People's Party established by Ata
turk himself and relied heavily on the enthusiastic support of the bureau
cracy-intelligentia as well as the rural elite.
The newly formed Democratic Party came

to power in 1950 with an over

whelming majority, enjoying the support of a grand coalition of liberal
minded intellectuals who were tired of a one party regime, the big business
men who disliked the etatist policy of the government, the peasants, who
for the first time could identify thems<2.lves with political power, and the
conservatives who reacted to the sweeping social and cultural changes as well
as to the diminished role of religion in daily life. The professed economic
policy of the government was liberal in its outlook with a shift of emphasis
to1he private sector. Also foreign private investments were encouraged.
Rapid increases in output were recorded during the first half of the ten
years of Democratic Party rule. A host of external factors contributed to
this development. Production increases in agriculture were due to rapid
-

./

expansion of cereal producing land-on one hand and to unusually favorable
weather conditions on the other.

Accumulated foreign exchange reserves

'

from the war years, as well as continuous foreign assistance made.it possible to increase imports. Turkey received no less than $1 billion in economic
assistance from the U.S. during these ten years, a large portion of which
was in the form of grants. Turkey's exports profited from the high con
juncture which had resulted from the Korean War.

Exports reached the level

-7-

J(f,O
of $ille million in 1953, a level which was not to be attained for the
following ten years.

On the other hand, the government initiated large in

vestment projects in highway construction, power plants, dams, and port fa
cilities. Rapidly increased internal demand stimulated the private sector
activities in manufacturing, trade, transportatinn and other services.
National income statistics also reveal the extent of this boom.

The

gross national product grew at an annual rate of 11.3 percent on the average
from 1950 through
cultural

the end of 1953, in real terms. Rate of increase of agri

production index was nearly 20 percent annually during the same

years, while the industrial output grew by approximately 12 percent annually
during the 1950-55 period.
The economic boom that marked the fi:rst years of the Democratic Party
rule lost its momentum by the mid-19SO's, and the economic situation de
teriorated rapidly through the end of the period. The external factors that
contributed to earlier expansion ceased to exist. But the government ignored
the severity of the problem and went ahead with her ambitious but uncoor
dinated policy and projects. Afraid of offending the popular base the Demo
crats relied on, high agricultu.ral support prices were maintained. Despite
earlier intentions of reducing the relative importance of the State in the
economy, government regulations were intensified and the State Economic
Enterprises were expanded.

New plant locations were freque·:'tly determined

by non-economic criteria. The prices of the goods and services provided by
the State Economic Enterprises were held down and the resulting deficits
were covered by the Central Bank transfers.

-8-

Once imports were cut down, scarcities and bottlenecks appeared in
production. The pace of the growth of gross national product went down to
approximately 4 percent.

t1onetary expansion on one hand and the supply

scarcities on the other caused the prices to soar at around 20 percent
annually. Despite the inflow of foreign aid, the insufficiency of foreign
exchange forced the government to resort to short-term borrowing and suppliers'
credits.
By 1958 Turkey was in deep trouble economically. The servicing of for
eign debt was not possible without interrupting the functioning of the
economy entirely. 1urkey 1 s creditors came to the rescue of the government
in August 1958, rescheduled her• existing debt, extended new credits and
forced the government to accept a stabilization package which included the
de facto devaluation of the Turkish lira which was overvalued by at least
300 percent, and to put ceilings on the Central Bank credits. The govern
ment followed the stabilization policy half-heartedly until the May 1960
military takeover.
The Democratic Party ran into serious difficulties on political grounds
also during the later part of the 1950vs.

Once ardent supporters of the

party, the intelligentsia gradually glided into opposition. As this group
became disillusioned and highly critical of the government policies, Demo
cratic leaders pushed measures to suppress the voice of the dissenters.
The Democrats under-estimated the role and the influence of this vocal
minority, and they

thought that they could de without their support since

the Party still enjoyed the support of the peasants and small town dwellers.

-9As the economic difficulties mounted, metropolitan centers, especially where
large universities are located, became very explosive. The government pre
ferred to use more oppressive

measures to deal with the

situation.

On the other hand, the reformist movement started by Ataturk in the 1920's,
had lost its momentum by the 1940 1 s.

But under the Democratic regime, re

forms came to a halt and in some cases were altogether withdrawn, with a
view to pamper and please the oonservative groups, All these developments led
to a new coalition in Turkey between the intelligentia and the military.
Few were surprised when the army took over the government in May 27, 1960,
a month after bloody student uprisings.
The new rulers of Turkey formed a Cabinet with civilians in majority,
and asked a group of professors to draw up a new constitution. They were
aware of the damage done to the economy by the unplanned and uncoordinated
policies of the previous government. They were also anxious to speed up the
rate of economic development and to carry out the necessary reforms to change
tresocial and economic structure.

So one of the early measures taken was

to initiate development planning and to establish a State Planning Organi
zation (SPO) in September 1960.

The revolutionaries also saw to it that

planning should continue after their transfer of power back to the civilians,
which they did in October 1961, and they ipcluded an article in the new con
stitution to this effect.
The planned development efforts of the 1960 1 s should be evaluated against
the background outlined briefly above.

However, before turning to actual

developments, the nature and main characteristics of Turkish Planning
should be introduced.
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II.

THE HECHANISN Mm 11AIN CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH PLAl."\JNING

The decades of the 19 50 1 s and the 1960 1 s marked worldwide enthusiasm
for economic planning as a tool to promote economic growth in the under
developed countries. Development plans were formulated, and implemented with
varying vigor and effectiveness.

Needless to say the political. system,

the economic and social structure, the institutional set-up and a host of
other factors influenced planning in these countries. Meanwhile, the ap
proaches to development planning have gradually changed as the countries
gained experience, and both plan formation and implementation improved
visibly in most countries.
As already mentioned, Turkey 1 s experience wit'.1 planning is unique
among the underdeveloped countries, for it goes back to the Thirities. The
two plans prepared in 1933 and 1938 differed from the present development
plans not so much in their overall strategy and approach, but rather in
their coverage. They were called Five-Year Industrialization Plan£:, indi
cating their non-comprehensive nature. They were designed to give a stimulus
to the process of industrialization through the establishment of infrastructure
and manufacturing plants.

Agriculture, construction, transportation, and

other services ,-1ere left outside of the framework of planning.
The targets of the first plan were basically accomplished but the imple
mentation of the second plan was interrupted by the Second World War. A third
plan was attempted soon after the War, in 1947, but the government did not
implement it. The official need and attitude of that time was ac;ay from
planning economic activities.

The approach and the sophistication of these

-11plans are not comparable to present planning in underdeveloped countries.
Nevertheless they represent one of the earliest attempts of planning for
accelerated development and thus have pioneering value.
Present planning in Turkey has its origin in the 1961 Constitution,
where planning for social

and economic development was defined as the

duty of the State. The State Planning Organization (SPO) is the government
agency responsible for drawing up the five-year plans and the annual pro
grams. The SPO is also given the responsibility to follow up the plan im
plementation and to advise the government on current economic policy
issues.
The SPO is made up of two bodies;

the Central Planning Organization

and the High Planning Council. The Central Planning Organization consists
of three departments, namely Economic Planning, Social Planning, and Coor
dination and is headed by an undersecretary responsible directly to the
Prime Minister. A fourth department of Investment and Export Promotion
and Implementation was established in 1967.
The High Planning Council has

eight members; the Prime Minister (or

deputy Prime l1inister) and three members of his Cabinet, the undersecretary
and three original departmentsv heads of the Central Planning Organization.
The Council serves as a liaison between the Central Planning Organization
and the Cabinet, and provides a forum where technicians can explain their
propositions and exchange views on developmental issues with the politicians.
The drafts prepared by the Central Organization become operational documents
after their adoption by the High Planning Council and the Cabinet. In the
case of the five-year plans the approval of the Parliament is also required.

-12The above information on the structure of the SPO reveals its purely
advisory nature.

A question frequently debated in planning literature is

what the status of the planning agencies should be within the adminis
tration of a country.

Within the Turkish Administrative system, the re

sponsibilities assigned to the SPO by law can be effectively served under
the above described set-up as long as the government want to employ planning
as a tool of accelerating economic development.

Unnecessary conflicts

that might arise among the various ministries on policy problems of exe
cution can usually be avoided.

Yet the SPO can be sufficiently effective

as an advisory agency on account of its access to the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet.
Since the establishment of the SPO, two five-year plans have been pre
pared in Turkey. The First Five Year Plan (FFYP) covered the 1963-67 period.
The implementation on the Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) began in 1968. Both
of these plans are comprehensive in nature and they cover the economic
activities in all sectors as well as the social aspects of economic
development. The plans are indicative with regard to the activities of the
private sector while the investment targets and measures dealing with the
public sector are imperative.
The five-year plans describe the objectives, identify bottlenecks, and
explain the overall policies. They contain quantitative targets for invest
ment, balance of payments, physical production, public finance, as well
as targets in employment, manpower, health and education. Investment and
production estimates for economic sectors and the subsectors of the manu-

-13facturing industry are given in detail, without making a distinction be
tween the public and private sectors. The projects to be implemented during
the plan are not identified in the five year plans; they are dealt with in
the annual programs.
Annual planning is invaluable in making the planning exercise more
operational .

It provides the much needed flexibility in plan implemen

tation, since plans may often become outdated or unrealistic within a few
years, mostly on account of exogenous factors such as successive poor
harvests.

It is also a formal link ~ween the medium term plans that

usually cover a period of five years and the government annual budgets.
Annual programs have also become an integral part of the Turkish plan
ning. According to the FFYP, annual programs were to "give scope for modify
ing initial working assumptions , revi~ing incorrect estimates and making
such other changes in the plan as may be necessary in the face of new con
ditions" and they were to be ' 1prepared every year in a new perspective
and attention will be concentrate d mainly on the revenue estimates and the
expenditure targets for the year covered.nl

Accordingly , program documents

have included not only the investment targets and specific policy measures
for the year in question, but also a general evaluation of the past perfor
mance of the economy as well as the development s in individual sectors.
Also, mid-term reviews of implementat ion were made in the 1966 and the 1970
Annual Programs.
As mentioned above, annual programming in Turkey has also provided the
framework for the selection of public sector projects, since they are not
1, First Five Year Development Plan, State Planning Organizatio n,
Ankara, 1963, p. 401.

-14explicit in the Plans.

During the annual program preparations, the new

project proposals submitted by the budgetary departments and the State
Economic Enterprises are evaluated, and the continuing projects are re
viewed by the SPO.

Meanwhile the size of the public sector investments in

individual sectors is very much affected by the private investment.

If pri

vate investors seem reluctant to invest in priority areas, the public
sector is expected to step in. As a result the relative shares of public
and private investments in different sectors in annual programs may be and
often are different from the distribution in five-year plans.
Implementation of the annual programs is followed up by the Central
Planning Organization and reported to the High Planning Council.

Imple

menting agencies are expected to report to the SPO once every three months.
The SPO also keeps a closer watch on a number of selected high-priority
projects.
Turkey's two five-year plans seem to be quite similar in their ob
jectives and overall approach.

They both encourage economic activities

in a mixed economy where both private and public sectors work together
to achieve accelerated growth.

Nevertheless, despite the similarities in

their general outlook, the two plans differ in their implementation poli
cies.

The preparation for FFYP began when the military was in power in

1961. But it was finalized and pactly implemented by the coalition govern
ments led by the Republican People's Party which is traditionally for
government intervention and leadership in economic development.

In 1965

the Justid2.Party which campaigned on basically the same economic policy
platform with the Democratic Party of 1950's came to power.

Nevertheless

-15-

the Justice Party governments implemented the remaining years of the Plan
without basically changing it. But when the SFYP was eventually formulated
the changes towards the implementation policies were obvious. In the new
strategy for development a leading role was assigned to the private sector
especially in the manufacturing industry.
The FFYP recognized that the public and private sectors are "the
two component parts of a whole" and not "two separate sectors with con
flicting interests."

But strong government direction was required because

"the change from an underdeveloped and stagnant economy to a progressive
and dynamic one may be achieved th'.Cough systematic and
taken by the central authority.n

rational measures

Moreover, it was expected that lithe

State should be vanguard of progress in the industrial sector by setting
up enterprises requiring a high level of technical knowledge and capital
in new fields of production. n

2

Hean.while, a considerable contribution

was expected of the private sector to the achievemcut of the goals of
the Plan and more specifically in the field of investment.

Private sector

investments were projected to increase at 11 percent per annum as against
10.6 percent annual income in public investments, over the five-year plan
period.
Various measures were

.

a~~:!;i=- ~.

n the FFYP and the programs to en-

courage the private sector investments 2.nd to affect their sectoral and
regional distribution. Some of the more important measures were tax relief
for approved investment, postponement of cGrtain duties on the imported in
vestment goods, and selective credit coatrol. The industries that would
benefit from these measures were specified j_n the Annual Programs.
2. Second Five Year Development Plan.
Ankara 1968, p. 112.

State Planning Organization,

-16A shift of emphasis to the private sector was made with the SFYP.

Poli

cies were designed to enable t½.e private sector nin the Second Plan period
to take over the development of the manufacturing industry in the long run. 11
The public sector was expected to "complete the investments already initiated
and to improve the efficiency of the existing production capacity" and to
nenter those fields of industry which the private sector cannot participate
in despite the incentives.n 3

Fixed investments of the private sector was

expected to increase by 12.5 percent annually.
In line with this new policy, a law was passed in 196 7' that enabled
the

government to diversify the measures to encourage private investments,

both domestic and foreign, to transfer government funds to the private sec
tor, and to empower the State Planning Organization to execute these mea
sures directly.

~owever, articles of this law concerning the outright

transfer of public funds were found to be unconstitutional and were removed in 1970.
Meanwhile the State Planning Organization went through some organi
zational changes.

A new department of "Investment and Export Promotion

and Implementation" was established and it became the largest and most
prominent department Hithin the SPO.

The new department was given the

task of not just coordinating but also implementing the measures designated
in the annual programs to encourage private investments and exports. The
encouragement measures used in the FFYP period were expanded and this time
included outright transfers to selected private enterprises. The SPO also
3.

Ibid, pp. 55, 56

11 ·
♦
assumed the responsibility of evaluating the foreign investment appli
cations. During the SFYP period, the interest of the SPO significantly
shifted from the actual planning and economic policy formulations to ad
ministration and execution of government policies and measures.
Another aspect of Turkish planning is worth mentioning here.

The

success of the plan implementation depends heavily on the cooperation and
willingness of the institutions that take part in the implementation.

On

the other hand the planning agencies regardless of how competently staffed
cannot have access to the information and expertize in diversified areas.
The functioning of a number of ciad hoc specialized committees,u similar
to French planning experience was SPO's solution to these problems.

In

the preparation of both First and Second Plans, a large number of committees
were formed,

staffed by representatives of both public and private sectors.

Their work was extensively used in plan formulations, particularly in the
preparation of sector programs.
It has already been pointed out that the general objectives of Tur
key's First and Second Five Year Plans were similar. They both aim at ac
hieving an annual 7 percent gross national product increase on the average,
a decline in the dependency on foreign assistance, and eventual elimination
of dependency by mid-70' s, reduction of the existing disparities in personal
and regional income distribution, and, a lowering of the level of unem
ployment, while maintaining relatively stable prices.
These general objectives of planning

in Turkey are also quite similar

to tbe objectives cited in other countries development plans. Thus it is a
point of interest to measure and evaluate Turkey's success in achieving
these aims.

III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY

A. Growth and Structural Change
The first obvious indicator of the rate of economic growth is the
rate of increase of the gross national product. Caution must be exercised,
though, in evaluating the growth performance of an economy based on the
GNP estimates alone. Growth recorded in a relatively short period of time
may be seriously affected by external factors such as weather conditions.
On the other hand in Turkey as in most underdeveloped countries, there is
considerable room for improvement in the methods and d3-ta used in the es
timation of these figures.
An annual 7 percent rate of growth of GNP was chosen as the primary
target of both the FFYP and the SFYP of Turkey, and the reason behind such
a choice was basically non-economic. It was argued officially that for
West European countries a 3.3 percent annual rate of economic growth had
been chosen, and, given nearly a 3 percent population gY"<Mth in Turkey,
the per capita growth target had to be no less than 4 percent, if Turkey
1
entertained any hope of ' catching up" with these countries.

In the SFYP,

the same rate of growth target was retained, because anything lessthan
this would have been politically unacceptable and anything higher than this
wou14. have required more strenuous efforts. The macro-economic calcula
tions in the annual programs were also based on 7 percent GNP increase
for the forthcoming years, regardless of the actual rates achieved in the
previous years.

Table 1

The Growth Rate of GNP and its Components
as Percentages in Real Terms

1952-62
Actual

1957-62
Actual

1962-67
Planned

1962-67
Actual

1967-72
Planned

1967-70
Actual

Agriculture

1.6

1.9

4.2

3.2

4.1

nil

Industry

5.7

3.6

12.3

9.7

12.0

8.4

Constructio n

4.1

-0.2

10. 7

8.0

7.2

9.1

Transportat ion

6.9

4.4

10.s

7.2

7.2

7.9

Housing

9.6

7.5

n. a.

8.1

5.9

9.2

Others

5.6

3.1

6.2

8.0

6.0

8.2

Net Domestic Income

3.8

3.3

6.9

6.4

6.8

GNP

3.9

3.4

7.0

6.7

7.0

5.6
5.9

Source:

State Planning Organizatio n

In Table 1, the planned and actual growth rates of GNP and its components
in real terms are shown, along with actual performance of the Turkish economy
during the ten and five years prior to plan implementation.
The information in T ble 1 reveals that there has been an apprecia
ble increase in the average rate of growth of GNP during the plan period
compared with the previous performance of the economy. During the 1952-62
period the GNP grew by approximately 4 percent annually, while the rate of
growth slowed down to 3.4 percent on the average, during the second five
years of this period. During the FFYP years the annual GNP growth rate
jumped to 6.7 percent. The rate of increase, however, seems to have slowed
down to a little less than 6 percent during the last three years.
On the other hand a closer examination of the sectoral breakdown of
the GNP reveals that the growth in key sectors were less sa~isfactory than
the overall growth rate indicates.

The increase in the agricultural value

added was 25 percent behind the target,at the end of five years of plan
implementation.

Moreover, during the first three years of the SFYP

there has been no growth in this sector.

In an economy like Turkey, where

agriculture constitutes over 30 percent of the total value added and 70
percent of the employment, this causes concern.

An average 4 percent annual

increase in agricultural output seems to be essential in view of the pre
sent population growth of 2.6 percent, as well as the supply requirements
of the manufacturing industry and exports. Stagnation of agricultural pro
duction over an extended period of time would have far reaching adverse
effects on Turkeyvs economic development,

In order to increase the yield in agricultura l production, the SFYP
strategy is to reduce the dependence of Turkish agriculture on weather
conditions through the introductio n of modern technology. Accordingly it
was emphasized in official documents that the use of modern tools and

fl/-

inputs would be encouraged, by maintaining an adequate supply* relatively low prices.

Investment in the development of soil and water resources

was also expected to contribute to the growth of agricultura l output.
There is considerabl e room for expansion of fertilizer use in Turkish
agriculture .

In 1961-62 the figure for Turkey was 3.0 kg (chemical con

tent) per hectare, compares very unfavorably with 35.2 kg. for Spain and
42.9 kg. for Greece, not to mention such high fertilizer users as Taiwan.
Relatively modest FFYP targets were realized when the consumption went up
to 1.5 million tons in 1967 from a level of approximate ly 300,000 tons in
1962.

During the first two years of SFYP implementat ion the targets were

fulfilled by a little over 70 percent.

Nevertheles s the fertilizer con

sumption went up to 2.3 million tons,
In 1962 only 1.1 million hectares of 6.7 percent of the total culti
vated land was under irrigation. The FFYP target was to add another O. 5
million hectares to this and the implementat ion fell short of this target
by approximate ly 25 percent. Experts maintain that the irrigated land
can be increased only up to 5 million hectares, given the water resources
and the rugged terrain of the country.

In efforts towards the mechaniza

tion of agriculture , the number of tractors increased since 1963, over
and above the plan forecasts while the other increase in total farm equip
ment fell significant ly short of the plan figures.

The information concerning the plan implementation reveals that even
though the plan targets have not been fully realized, efforts were made
in years to increase the yield in the agricultural sector.

Unfavorable

weather may be blamed only partially for the failure in increasing the
output. Some changes in the institutions seem to be warranted. A land
reform which not only distributes but also consolidates the fragmented
holdings should contribute to the yields.

Heasures to improve marketing

conditions and the distribution of agricultural credits may also pay off
in terms of increased efficiency. These measures should not of course be
considered as alternatives to the efforts of improving technology but as
complementary to them.
The industrial value added rose sharply in Turkey during the plan
years compared with the loH performance of the previous decade. Neverthe
less the value added increase fell short of the FFYP targets by approxi
mately 25 percent. During SFYP the rate of growth in the industrial sector
slowed down to 8.4 percent compared with the 9.7 percent growth rate of the
previous five years.
In Turkey's national accounts the "industry" sector consists of mining,
manufacturing and energy.
cent of the total.

Hanufacturing value added is roughly 90'per-

In the SFYP of Turkey, "highest priority'' is given to

the development of the manufacturing industry and it is defined as the
"leading sector 11 of the economy.

Approximately 40 percent of the increase

in GNP was expected to come from manufacturing. In the SFYP, the share of
the investments in the manufacturing industries was increased to 22.4

-23percent of the total from less than 20 percent in the FFYP, while the agri
cultural investments were kept roughly at 15 percent in both plans.
A special emphasis was given to the expansion of the industries pro
ducing capital goods and intermediate products, in both FFYP and the SFYP.
Increased production in these industries was expected to reduce the import
requirements as well as to stimulate further

investments in productive

fields. The basic difference in the strategies to the two plans is that
the FFYP assigned a leading role to the public sector in the indusrriali
zation while the SFYP relies heavily on the private initiative.
In view of the past experience, the direction of industrializati on
envisaged in the SFYP seems to be very difficult to accomplish without
effectively using the potential of the public sector.

Private entrepreneurs

.prefer investments in the consumer goods industries for very understandable
reasons.

Heavy industries require large amounts of capital, technological

know-how and risk, while the consumer goods industries assure quick profits
even with small investments.
The developments in the manufacturing industry in recent years support
this. Despite measures of encouragement, the favored industries such as
machine building, and electronics have benn behind targets whereas con
sumer goods industries in general, and food and beverages in particular,
have surpassed the projected production levels. Also, in the area of con
sumer durables, assembly plants have been encouraged by highly: protective
tariffs and often with quotas. As a result, even though the output in the
manufacturing industry has increased substantially during the plan years

the pattern of industrialization is different from the one outlined in the
plans. Concentration on consumer goods and assembly-type industries should
be expected to adversely affect the level of domestic savings on the one
hand and increase the import requirements on the other.

Turkey's raw

material and semi-manufactured import requirements increased in recent
years at the same rate of increase in industrial production, that is, by
roughly 10 percent annually.

Also, the high-level protection extended to

these industries encouraged the establishment of uncompetitive and ineffic
ient small-scale plants, operating with high rate of profits in the domestic
market only.
Meanwhile, the structur2 of the Turkish economy has gone through some
changes.

Table 2 shows the relative shares of the economic sectors within

the total value added, from 1952 through 1970.
During the ten years prior to the plan, the share of agriculture went
down from nearly 50 percent of the total value added to 41 percent, while
industry grew from 12 percent to approximately 17 percent and services
from 38.3 to 42 percent within the total.

On the other hand, at the end

of eight years of plan implementation the structure of the net domestic
product is considerably different from the plan projections. The proportion
of both agricultural and industrial value added is behind the projected
share.

Table 2
Structural Change of the Turkish Economy

(1952-1970)
1952

1962

(As Percentages of Net Domestic Product)
1970
1967
Planned Actual
Planned Actual

Agriculture

49.7

41.1

36.1

35.3

32.7

30.6

Industry

12.0

16.,

21.6

19.4

22.5

20.6

Constructio n

4.1

5.6

6.7

6.2

6.4

7.3

Transportat ion

6.4

6.7

7.9

6.8

6.8

7.3

Housing

2.5

3.5

2.5

3.5

3.4

3.4

25.3

26.2

25.2

28.8

28.2

30.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Other Services
Net Domestic
Product

Source:

State Planning Organizatio n

From this observation , one would draw different conclusions depending
on different assumptions .

One conclusion may be that planning in Turkey

has not been successful in changing the structure of the economy. The sec
tors that produce ''goods" did not grow according to plan targets while the
"service(! producing sectors surpassed the plan targets. Another conclusion
might be that the coefficient s used in the plans describing the relative
growth in different sectors were incorrectly estimated.

In other words,

the assumption of the SFYP that goo<ls and services producing sectors were
to grow at approximate ly the same rate was inappropria te. Such an outcome
calls for a review of the plan coefficient s.

A third and probably more

likely possibility is that the output of the services sector is overestimat ed.
Further exploration of this last point is beyond the scope of this paper.
It would be also revealing to examine the changes in thearerage and
marginal productivit y of labor and capital in different sectors, as an in
But because of the scarcity of the data,

dicator of the structural change.

an attempt has been made to estimate only changes in the average productivit y
of labor from 1955 throughout 1970.

Table 3
Average Productivit y of Labor
In 1961 prices
In TL.

1963-70

(4/1)

1968-70
(3)

(3/2)

113., 7

2. 484

109.3

2.350

117. 6

9.351

107.2

10. 613

113.5

9. 898

113.5

13. 642

13. 701

100.4

13.744

100.3

13.720

100.6

3.81!)

4.633

121. 6

5.542

119.6

4.987

131.0

1955-62
(1)

1967-69
( 2)

(2/1)

Agriculture

1.998

2. 272

Industry

8. 723

Services

(4)

Average output/labo r
ratio

All Sectors

Source:

FFYP, SFYP, 1971 Annual Program

Table 3 shows that the average productivit y of labor was 31 percent
higher during the plan years compared with the eight years average prior
to the plan implementat ion.

On the other hand the average productivit y

of labor has not changed in the services sector, while it has increased by
17.6 percent in agriculture and 13.5 percent in the industry. The reason
why the average productivit y of labor in agriculture increased by a rela
tively higher rate is because of the fact that the employment in agricul
ture has been stable in recent years, as it will be revealed in the dis
cussion of the employment situation.
B.

Export Performance

The role of the exports in the growth process is many sided.

The con

tinuous increase in a country's exports indicates an increased demand for
the domestic production, and thus provides~ direct stimulus to the growth
process.

This important aspect of export growth is often overlooked in

planning and exports are treated as a source of foreign exchange only.
is not to suggest that the latter aspect of exports is unimportant .

This

In

plan implementin g countries, the accelerated investments , increased level
of production, and overall increased domestic demand contribute to the high
demand for imports and thus for foreign exchange.

In countries where ser

vices do not contribute to the total foreign exchange earnings in a major
way, and where foreign aid is either found unreliable or not forthcoming
in substantial amounts, exports are the only source for financing the high
level of imports.

Alongside the need for increased exports, the diversification of ex
ports is also important from the development point of view.

The specific

problems that may originate from a heavy reliance on one or two agricul
tural commodities are all too well known to be

elaborated here.

On ac

count of this, diversification of exports has become a priority target
in many countries' development plans. The setting of such a target also
implies a rise in the share of manufactured products within the total ex
port bill.
In Turkey, exports did not show any increase in value during the ten
years prior to 1964.

Partially under the influence of this unfavorable

development the export targets were held at a modest level in the FFYP.
Once the export earning started to pick up in 1964 the
FFYP were surpassed by more than 10 percent.

targets of the

On the other hand SFYP en

visaged a 7.2 percent annual increase for exports. Despite increases in
the export earnings in the first three years of the SFYP period, the rate
of increase has been behind the plan target.
Table 4 shows the relative share of different commodity groups within
the total exports as well as the absolute level of exports earnings from
1960 through 1969.

Table 4
Structure of Turkey's Exports
(in percentages)

Agricultural Products
Value of
Exports

Cotton
Tobacco
Nuts

Manufactures

Total

Minerals

Food
Products

Total

Total

Total
Exports

1960

320. 7

{50.2) **

81.6

{6.0)

8.6

9.8

100.0

1962

381.2

(58. 9)

87.9

(2.6)

5.4

6.7

100.0

1963

368.1

(56.0)

87.6

(3. 5)

7.8

4.6

100.0

1964

410.8

(5 7. 8)

84.0

(5. 3)

9.8

6.2

100.0

1965

46 3. 7

(56.0)

85.9

(2.4)

5.9

8.2

100.0

1966

490.5

(60. 7)

85.2

(2.2)

5.0

9.8

100.0

1967

522.7

(65.4)

88.8

(2.2)

4.0

7.2

100.0

1968

496.4

(64.0)

87.0

(1.4)

4.9

8.1

100.0

1969

536.8

(57.9)

82.4)

(3. 8)

9.4

8.2

100.0

State Institute of Statistics, Annual Foreign Trade
Statistics
* Value of exports in million US$.
Figures in parentheses show the share of each group within the total exports.

Source:

**

The value of Turkey's exports increased by a little over 6 percent
annually during the plan years.

The increase in exports earnings can be

attributed basically to the sudden jump of the external demand for Turkey's
three traditional export commodities, namely tobacco, cotton, and nuts.
Cotton exports from a level of 46.5 million dollars in 1960 went up to
nearly 140 million dollars in 1968.

Tobacco exports

reached its peak in

Despite efforts to promote exports of industria l origin, their share
in the total gradually declined through 1968.

Food products led manufactu red

goods, and textiles and clothing were second on the list.

Only in 1969

was there a significa nt jump in food and textile exports but it is too early
yet to consider this a trend.
A system of tax rebate has been used in Turkey as a measure to pro
mote e~ports, basically for the manufactu red commodit ies.

Until 1967,

an ad hoc committee (IVIK) associate d with the Ministry of Finance deter
mined the rates and stipulatio ns to be applied to various commodit ies.

The

duties of this committee were later transferr ed to the newly establish ed
Departmen t of Investmen t and Export Pr~~sion and Implemen tation of the
-29aState Planning Organizat ion. "Lowering the cost of export credits", the
establishm ent of a low interest "a special export fund" and ;/an export pro
motion fund" are among the measures currently cpplied.

Also, provision s

have been made to give priority to importers in the allocatio n of foreign
exchange as well as measures taken

~-o

reduce the number of bureaucr atic

formaliti es.
The experienc e of recent years is not very encouragi ng as far as the
results achieved in diversify ing Turkey's exports and in increasin g the
volume of industria l exports. Some of the measures mentioned are rather
recent and may show their impact in the long run. Another developme nt that
is being followed with interest is the impact of the August 1970 devalu
ation on exports.

One of the obvious reasons behind this move was of course
'

to give a boost to Turkdy's exports.

1967 with 118 million dollars compared with 65.5 million dollars in 1960.
The increase for nuts was from 45.9 million in 1960 to 115,2 million dollars
in 1969.

Thus while Turkey 9 s exports grew in the 1960 's approximately at

the same rate with the exports from fthe underdeveloped countries, there
has hardly been any change in their distribution. The share of agricul
tural products was persistently above 80 percent of the total, and cotton,
tobacco and nut exports constituted between SO and 65 percent of the
overall exports throughout the period.
[ Insert p. 29a J
C. Mobilization of Domestic Resources
Development planning involves a more efficient utilization of the
existing
other.

.capacity on one hand and broadening the resource base on the
One important aspect of enlarging the resource base is the increased

mobilization of the domestic savings.

In Turkey, the targets for domestic

savings in the five-year plans were determined from the figures for gross
investments after allowance was made for the expected external savings
throughout the plan period.
In the formulation of the FFYP, an implicit marginal capital output
ratio of 2.62 was assumed. Furthermore this ratio was expected to increase
from 2. 42 in 1963 to 2. 77 in 1970.

The reason given in the FFYP document

for the assumption of a gradual increase in the capital coefficient was the
presence of unused capacity which was expected to be rapidly utilized in the
earlier years of plan implementation.

Accordingly, the ratio of gross

fixed investments to the gross national product was expected to increase
from an average 14.8 percent in the 1957-61 period, to 17 percent in 1963

-31On

and 19.4 percent in 1967, averagin g 18.3 percent for the FFYP period.

the other hand, it was suggeste d in the FFYP that the contribu tion of ex
ternal savings would be about 3.5 percent of the gross nationa l product
while domestic savings would make up for the remainin g 14.8 percent.

This

meant an effort of 2 percenta ge point increase s in domestic savings from
1957-196 1 level.
In the estimati on of therl>ove investm ent and saving requirem ents, stocks
were not taken into account. In the SFYP stock estimate s were also included
in the projecti ons. The margina l capital- output ratio for the SFYP based
on total investm ents, includin g the stocks, was 3.24 on the average , in
creasing from a level of 2.94 in 1968 to 3.47 in 1972.

Given the investm ent

requirem ents of 22.7 percent of the gross nationa l product in the SFYP period,
domestic savings were expected to increase from 18.6 of the gross nationa l
product in 1968 to 22.6 percent in 1972, averagin g 20.8 percent. The contri
bution of the externa l savings was expected to be on the order of 1.9 per
cent of the gross nationa l product for the period under consid~ ration.
Table 5 shows the developm ents in the mobiliz ation of domestic savings .
The ratios given here for the average domestic savings are not directly com
parable to the ones given in the FFYP, because Table 5 figures take into
account the stock changes also, whereas FFYP saving projecti ons are based
only on fixed investm ents. Neverth eless, the figures in the Table indicate the changes in the level of saving and provide sufficie nt informa tion
to evaluate the plan targets.

I.
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Tabl e 5
Mob iliza tion of Domestic Savi ngs
In mill ion TL. , in 1965 pric es

Gros s
Savi ngs( S)

Domestic
Exte rnal
Savi ngs( Sf) Sav ings (~

1957-1961

SdLGNP Sft.GNP

SfL

s

14.5 0

2.00

12.1 2

Chain Inde x
of Sd Incr ease

1963

12,0 29.5

2,94 3.0

9,08 6.5

13.6 0

4.41

24.3 8

1964

12,1 67.7

981. 0

11,1 86. 7

15.9 8

1.40

8.10

12,7 10.0

684. 0

12,0 26.0

16.4 3

0.93

5,36

107. 5

1965

16,2 24.3

1,42 2.0

14,8 02.3

18.3 3

1.76

8.76

123. 1

1966

1,02 6.0

15,8 39.1

18,4 9

1. 20

6.10

107. 0

1967

16,8 65.1

16.5 7

1.94 10,5 4

1963-1967

123. 1

19,5 27.0

1,99 8.0

17,5 29,0

19,1 9

2.19 10.2 4

110. 7

1968

1, 926, 0

18,9 34.7

19,4 9

1.98 9.22

108. 0

1969

20,8 60.7

2,219 .o

20,0 11.0

19. 75

2.18 9.94

105, 7

1970

22,2 30.9

19.4 8

2.12

1968-1970
Sour ce:

FFYP and 1971 Annual Program

9. 80

-33The level of domestic savings went from 13.5 percent of the gross
nationa l product in 1963 to 18.5 percent in 1967, averagin g 16.6 percent
for the FFYP period. Compared to the 1957-196 1 period this correspo nds to
an approxim ate 2 percenta ge point increase which was the target given in
the FFYP. Thus, even though the increase in domestic savings in absolute
terms did not reach the targets, in terms of the relative efforts, plan
targets were fulfille d.

On

the other hand, externa l savings fell short of

the plan projecti ons. The level of externa l savings averaged about 2 per
cent of the gross nationa l product instead of the expected 3.5 percent. As
a result, 10.5 percent of the total investm ents were financed by externa l
resource s instead of 19 percent as was expected in the FFYP.
In the SFYP period, the rate of increase in domestic savings slowed
down and was around 19.5 percent of the gross nationa l product for the first
three years, which correspo nded to the plan targets. The actual level of
externa l savings was

also close to the plan projecti ons for the same period.

The targets for domestic savings in FFYP and the realizat ion figures
in annual program s have been given in totals only, and thus it is not possi
ble to separate private savings from public savings . But the investme nt
figures for public and private sectors as well as the statisti cs on public
accounts indicate that savings of both types increase d at rates not too
differen t from each other.
Another indicato r of the volume of the domestic resource mobiliz a
tion is the increase in the total revenues of the governm ent in general and
the tax revenues in particu lar. Table 6 shows the actual size of the govern-

-34Table 6
Public Revenue and Expenditure s
(As percentage of GNP)
Actual

1968-70

1963-67
Planned

Actual

Planned

Actual

1963

1967

1970

28.6

23.7

29.6

26.8

22.8

24. 8

28.9

17.2

14.4

18.8

16.4

13.3

15.7

17.5

29. 2

24.6]

29.6

27.7

23.8

25.3

28.5

Current Expenditure s

13.5

11. 7

13. 8

12.0

11.6

12.1

12.2

Investments

10,9

9.1

11.7

10. 8

8.2

9.5

11.0

4.7

4.1)

4.2

4.5

4.0

3.7

5.4

Total Revenues

(of which)Tax Revenues
Total Expenditure s

Transfers

Source: Annual Programs

ment revenues and tax revenues in contrast with the planned levels. Also
shown in the table are the various forms of public expenditure s.
Even though the actual revenues of the government fell behind the tar
gets throughout the plan implementat ion, the share of these revenues within
the gross national product increased from 22.8 percent in 1963 to 28.9 per
cent in 1970,

On the other hand tax revenues rose from'13.3 percent of the

gross national product in 1963, to 15.7 percent in 1967, and to 17.5 in 1970.
The increase in tax revenues was due more from changes in the tax system

-35than as a response to income increases. A number of new taxes was intro
duced and changes were made in the nature of the existing taxes during the
Plan years.

As will be further elaborated in the discussion of tax re-

form, these measures were designed with a view to increase the tax revenues,
and they were successful in this respect.
The public expenditures shown in Table 6 cover the current expenditures
made mainly from the budget, the investments of both State Economic Enter
prises and budgetary agencies, and transfers made from the budget, such as
It is important to note here that the share of the current

debt payments.

expenditures within the gross national product did not increase significant
ly from 1963 to 1970, while the government revenues were growing. The ex
perience elsewhere is that current expenditures keep pace with the revenue
increases. The government in Turkey clamped down on the demand for salary
increases up until 1970. But an overall salary increase of more than 50
percent is planned for 1971, which will certainly be reflected in the
current expenditures.

On the other hand, the relative share of the public

investment expenditures in the gross national product increased visibly,
from 8.2 percent in 1963 to 11 percent in 1970.

The nature of this increase

will be more obvious when the evaluation of the plan investments is made.
Capital Formation

D.

Since the beginning of the plan implementation, the gross fixed invest
ments have- shown a marked increase both in absolute amount and as a percen
of the gross national product. Table 7 shows the changes in the gross
t~e
'·.
.......

-~- fixed i1-1vestments from 1953 through 1970, its distribution between the public
'-

'

and_private sectors, and between machinery and construction.

.'

'

.....

'

'-
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Table 7
Gross Fixed Investments

In 1961 Prices

1953-62

1963-67

1968-70

Gross Fixed Investment

70,658
7,066

53,846
10,770

49,317
16,440

15.8

17.()

20.3

Private

53.1

47.5

46.8

Public

46.9

52.5

53.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

Hachinery & Equip~ent

32.7

31.0

Construction

67.3

69.0

Total

100.0

100.0

Total
Annual
As Percentages of GNP

Total

·Source:

State Institute of Statistics, "National
Income, 1938, 1948-1969", 1971 Annual Program
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According to Table 7 gross fixed investments averaged approximately 7
billion TL annually during the ten-year period prior to plan implementation.
The FFYP investments were 52 percent higher than this average at an annual
level of nearly 10.8 billion TL. During the three years of SFYP, average
annual
period.

investments increased.by another 53 percent compared with the FFYP
Meanwhile the share of gross fixed investments in· the gross national

product increased to 17.0 in the FFYP, from a level of 15.8 in the 1953-62
period, to 20.3 percent in the SFYP period.
Before plan implementation began, private investments constituted more
than half of total investments.

But this trend has reversed since 1963,

and public investments increased to 52.5 percent of the total in the 1963-67
period and to 53.2 percent during the last three years.

On the other hand

there has not been a drastic change in the composition of total investments;
machinery and equipment amounted to 32.7 percent and 31 percent of the total
investments, during the pre-plan period and the FFYP period, respectively.
After observing the general trends of capital formation in Turkey, it
is revealing to examine the implementation of the plan targets and the dis
tribution of investments among different sectors.
The following table shows the rate of implementation of the invest
ment targets as they appeared in the annual programs.
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Table 8
Implementation Ratios of Sectoral

Investment Targets

in Annual Programs

1963-67

1968-70

Public

Private

Total

Agriculture

• 84

.99

• 89

• 86

·LOS

• 94

Mining

.88

• 84

.87

1.01

• 76

.95

Manufacturing

• 70

1.16

.95

1.08

.94

.99

Energy

.n

.37

• 69

1.00

1.06

1.00

Transportation

.93

1.27

. 99·

1.12

1.00

1.08

Tourism

.32

.83

.58

.87

• 83

• 84

Housing

.99

1.07

1.07

1.47

1.03

1.06

Health

• 81)

• 8()

• 80

1.00

.96

1.00

Education

• 89

.96

.90

.91

1.04

.91

1.00

1.57

1.12

1.03

.95

1.00

Other Services
Development Funds
TOTAL

Private

• 84
• 83

Source:

Public

1.08

Annual Programs

0.94

1.02

Total

• 84

.99

1.00

Table 8 indicates that the investment targets of the FFYP were realized
by 94 percent, while 100 percent realization was achieved in the SFYP period.
\·

On the other hand, in the F'FYP period the public sector was able to fulfill
only 83 percent of the t2rgets against more than 100 percent realization
for the private sector. The rate of implementat ion is approximate ly equal
for the public and private sector in the SFYP.
In the FFYP period implementat ion in housing, transportat ion and manu
facturing investments were

the highest in that order. The lowest imple

mentation was found in the tourism a:..1d energy investuents . The rate of im
plementatio n is relatively high in all sectors, over 90 percent, with the
exception of tourism investments . The major fa.ctor behind the relatively
higher realization ra~io in the SFYP is the large investment projects in
the public sector reached the irnple:.1entat ion stage. These projects were
conceived during the FFYP, but their implementat ion was delayed on account
of problems in project preparation and dorr.estic and foreign

financing.

Caution must be exercised in evnl~ating the imple~entat ion ratios given
in Table 8.

Th2 targets set in the annual progrems for investments in a

given year are determined by the prj_ces of two years earlier.

That is,

the investment targets for 1966 in the 1966 Annual Program are expressed
in 1964 prices. This is because the most recent prices available in the
preparation of the 1966 Prog:cam were the 1964 price f:Lgures. Since the im
plementatio n figures ::i.re not 1£:.+:er on adjusted to the price changes, the
implementat ion ratios reflect the increases in the prices of investment
goods during these twc years and are biased on the high side. A second
warning is that all these r2.tios reflect the. expenditure s made on individual

-40projects. They do not necessarily retlect the physical accomplishment. A
third point is that the estimates made for the private sector investments
are only in the nature of approximations, since the statistics in this
area are very crude.
It is also very important to compare the actual sectoral distribution
of investments with the planned and progr2mmed targets.

In Table 9 this

comparison is made f~r both the FFYP and the SFYP periods.

Table 9
Sectoral Distribution of Fixed Investments in Plans,
Annual Programs, and Realization
1968-72

1963-67
F'FYP

Annual
Programt::

Realization

SFYP

1968-70
1968-70
An.Programs Fe alization

17. 7

16.2

15.3

15.2

14.8

13.4

5.4

6.1

5.6

3.7

3.0

3.0

16.9

l:1.0

19,5

22. lf

23.3

23.1

8.6

8.3

6.1

8.0

8.9

9.1

13. 7

14.9

15.7

16.1

15.4

16. !J

Tourism

1.4

2.1

1.3

2.3

2.6

2.1

Housing

20.3

19.4

22,3

17.9

18.4

19.8

Health

2.3

2.0

1.7

1.8

1.7

1.7

Education

7.1

6.9

6.5

6.7

5.8

5.3

Other Services

6.6

5.1

6. 0

5.5

5.9

5.9

O. li

0.2

0.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

Agriculture
Mining
Hanufacturing
Energy
Transportation

Development Fund
100.0

TOTAL

Source;

]_00. 0

180.0

FFYP, SFYP, and-1971 Annual Program

-41Housing investments in both plan periods seem to have claimed a relative
ly larger share of the total investments than actually planned.

Invest

ments in agriculture , tourism, and education actually shared a relatively
smaller portion of the total than planned, while the share of other sectors'
investments was close to the planned proportions .
E.

Employment

Like other underdevelo ped countries with a relatively high popula
tion growth, Turkey faces a serious unemployment problem. The paucity of
employment statistics, particularl y in agriculture and services, presents
difficultur es in studying the trends;

nevertheles s, they sufficientl y re

veal the seriousness of the problem. The supply of labor increases by
approximate ly 3 percent annually at present while the demand for labor has
not been growing even at half of the rate of increase of supply.
Creating new employment opportuniti es, and thus helping to solve
the unemploymen t problem in the long run, was one of the explicit targets
of the FFYP. The Plan recognized that approximate ly 8.5 million new jobs
were needed during the 15 year period between 1963-78 in order to solve
the problem, but envisaged that only 6. 8 million new jobs IiTere to be realized,
assuming the investment and production targets of the Plan were fulfilled.
Some 2.1 million new jobs were projected for the first five years covering
the 1963-67 period.
I

However, employment was not among the primary targets of the Second
Five Year Development Plan.

Employment was seen as a function of the rate
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of growth of the gross national product. The Second Plan reads" ••• during
the 1968-72 period efforts to create employment will

he treated as a

result of the rapid growth of the economy and will not be considered as
an independent goal outside the general development.''

Also, a number of

rather vague policy measures were specified in the Plan concerning employ
ment, such as

11

emphasis will be given to sectors which have high employ

ment potential,'' and nin all sectors high priority will be given to pro
jects which offer many employment opportunities and which would save capital
and create employment without increasing production costs. 114
It was also estimated in the SFYP that the absolute level of unem
ployment in non-agricultural sectors would grow slowly from 399,000 in
1967 to 470,000 in 1972 and the unemployment rate would come down from 9.5
percent in 1967 to 8.2 vercent in 1972.

Also a sharp reduction in both

the absolute level and the rate of disguised unemployment was expected in
the agricultural sector.
The employment targets of the FFYP fell considerably short of being
realized. Table 10 shows what happened in employment during the 1963-67
period.
Employment increased at a relatively faster rate in the FFYP period
compared with the aver&ge annual increases during the previous seven years,
in all sectors e:R:cept .s,griculture. The overall annual increase in employ
ment during the plan period was 1. 8% on the average, while it had been
approximately 1.3% during the previous years.
4.

SFYP, pp. 141, 149.

Nevertheless the new employ-
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l'.)

Changes in Employment
(in thousands)

1955
Agriculture

1962

Annual
Rate of
Increase
1955-62

1967

Annual
Rate of
Increase
1962-67

Planned
Increase
1962-67

Actual
Increase
1962-67

Difference

9,446

9,727

0.4

9,940

0.4

70()

213

-487

Industry

805

1,048

3.9

1,424

6.2

316

376

60

Construction

200

319

6.9

472

8.1

204

153

-51

'frade

341

418

3.0

498

3.6

+ransportation

190

253

4.2

339

6.1

800

474

-416

Services

496

759

6.3

1,066

7.0

11,479

12,524

1.3

13, 739

1.8

2,110

1,215

-894

Total

Source:

f
.,._

Based on information given in SFYP {1968-1972)

ment created during the 1963-67 period fell considerably behind targets in
agriculture and services while industrial eNployment increased more than
the forecast.
{

\

.

On the whole the shortfall in the employment expectations

a little over 40% over the Plan period.

was

-44The unavailability of reliable time series for change in employment
The SPO revised the employment

in Turkey has already been pointed out.

statistics once again, with the 1971 Annual Program. The estimatet are
based on the 1965 Census results and indicate a relative worsening of the
employment situation in recent years.

Table 11 summarizes these new

estimates.
Table 11
New Employment Series and Excess Labor
(in thousands)
1967
1965
(census results)

1969

1971

Annual Percen
t age Change
(1971-1967)

(estimate)

Agriculture

8, 772

9,044

8,897

8,769

-LO

Industry

1,074

1,240

1,402

li,549

Construction

351

409

470

529

5.7
7.2

Trade

332

366

42!)

457

5.7

Transportation

287

321

366

411

6.4

Services

837

977

1,130

1,298

7.4

Not specified

413

413

413

413-

Demand for Labor
(Total)

12,016

12,770

13,098

13,426

1.0

Supply of Labor

13,044

13,792

14,581

15,436

2.9

1,028

1,022

1,483

2,010

0

43

190

420

1,028

979

1,293

1,59/J

Excess Labor
External Demand
Final excess labor
Source:

19 71 Annual Program, Tables;

426, 427.

------

-45According to new employment figures, the level of
been growing rather rapidly since 1965.

unemployment has

Demand for labor increased by

only 1 percent during the SFYP period. This compares unfavorably with
both the FFYP period, and pre-plan years. The level of unemployment is
expected to reach 10.3 percent in 1971 from the level of 7.9 percent in
1965.
The worsening of the employment situation in Turkey, coincides with
a period when Turkish workers migrated to Western Europe in increasing
numbers. Since 1964 approximately 500,000 Turkish workers have found em
ployment in iJestern Europe, mostly in "iJestern Germany.

This total is equal

to nearly one third of the employment in industry in Turkey at present.
I

In the short run, it has helped to ease the unemployment problem. Without
this external demand for the Turkish labor• the level of unemployment in
Turkey would have been no less than 13 percent by 19 71.
The labor migration from Turkey, on the other hand aggravates the
problem of a skilled labor shortage.

In Turkey despite a very high level

of unutilized labor, serious shortages have persisted in the field of
skilled labor, and giventhe.present educational and training capacity
the gap" particularly in technical manpower will widen in the coming years.
Even thmugh the government's policy has been to send abroad only the un
skilled labor, no less than 50 percent of the outgoing labor had some de
gree

of skill.
These pieces of evidence suggest that planning in Turkey has not so

far made a tangible impact on the employment problem, and if anything, both
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the absolute level and the rate of unemployment have increased. The em
ployment strategy of the SFYP has
the severity of the problem.

proven to be ineffective in view of

It is generally correct

to expect increases

in job opportunities as the economy grows at relatively high rates.

Never

theless, it would be unrealistic to expect job increases to be at levels
necessitated by rapid growth of the labor supply, without carefully designed
employment policies. The fact that employment has not followed the in
creases in investment and output is not unique to Turkey;

most

under

developed countries have gone through a similar experience.
A combination of factors contribute to the present crisis in em
ployment.

The singlemost important factor aggravatinr, the employment pro

blem everywhere is the high rates of ·increase of population in general
and in urban population in particular. For example, given the· present
2.6 percent annual population increase in Turkey, it does not seem feasible
to gainfully employ all the newcomers to the labor force which itself
grows at 2.9 percent annually, without seriously hampering the productivity
and growth. Even though any immediate reduction in the birth rate will
f

not affect the labor supply for the next fifteen years, the long term
solution of the unemployment problen relies on the population policies to
a great extent.
A second observation in connection with the unemployment problem in
underdeveloped countries is the overall impact of the government economic
policies.

More specifically in most countries the pr~sent policies con

cerning wages, foreign exchange and rate of interest do not usually favor
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the use of more abundant factor which is the labor. The actual pattern
of developme nt in labor surplus economies does not follow the theoretic ally
appealing A. Lewis's model of "unlimite d supplies of labor", where the
wage rate does not change in the non-agric ultural sectors as long as there
is a supply of excess labor in the rural sector.

Instead, the wages in

urban sectors have increased well above the rural wage levels and at
faster

rates than productiv ity increases , as a result of government

minimum wage policies and the increased bargainin g power of the trade unions.
This has been a significa nt factor in discourag ing the use of labor inten
sive technolog ies.
On the other hand, the rate of interest has been deliberat ely kept at
relativel y low

levels in order to encourage investmen ts. This in tum re

sulted in the encourage ment of capital intensive technique s, against the
labor intensive ones.

In addition to low interest rate policy, the govern

ment's have encourage d the capital goods imports by maintaini ng overvalue d
currency and through special provision s made for capital goods

imports.

Even though some of these policies can be defended in isolation , neverthe
less all together they have adversely affected the employment situation and
distorted the resource utilizatio n.
These general observati ons are also valid in the Turkish case. It is
true that the urban wages increased more rapidly than the rural wages and
beyond the actual productiv ity increases . For example, before the legislatio n
of the collectiv e bargainin g the real wages of labor covered by social in
surance

increased by approxim ately 1 percent annually in the 1953-63

-48period,

After the collective bargaining legislation the annual real wage

increases have been on the order of 5.5 percent since 1964. 5 Meanwhile
the average increase in labor productivity has been considerably less than
this as Table 3 indicates.

Also, the rate of interest has been pegged at

relatively low rates for the investors in both private and public sectors.
And the Turkish lire has been greatly overvalued throughout the plan years.
All these factors contributed to the discouragement of the labor intensive
industries and technologies in Turkey. The result has been increased unem
ployment.
The Turkish public sector has invested in some large scale undertakings
such as petro-chemicals, paper, and fertilizers, and once these plants
start production, they will have a favorable impact on employment.

Never

theless the problem of unemployment remains as a formidable challenge to
the policy makers and requires a more straightfo~Rard approach within the
framework of economic planning.

mu

It would be .,...leading to conclude from

the above observations that a simple solution to the problem lies within
the range of policies hitherto discussed. They did contribute to the worsen
ing of the problem, but a realistic solution also involves the considera
tion of the bigger issues of capital formation and choice of technology
in relation to long term economic development, as will be discussed
in connection with economic policies •

.5.

1971 Annual Programme, Official Gazette, p. 215.
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Self-Sustained Economic Growth

Self-sustained economic growth was a high priority target of both the
FFYP and SFYP.
the

According to the definition adopted in both plans, reaching

stage of self-sustained growth--or viability--mean t maintaining a 7

percent annual rate of growth without resorting to any concessionary _foreign
credits, that is, long term credits with low interest rate and often with a
grace period.
Throughout the last two decades, the current accounts of Turkey's balance
of payments have consistently s~own a deficit, indicating that there has been
continuous resource transfer from the rest of the,w~rld.

The size of the

current account deficit varied between 50 million dollars in 1950 and
300 million dollars in 1963.

During the ten years prior to plan implemen

tation, the size of these resource transfers were about 2.2 percent of the
gross national product, 15 percent of the total fix~pital formation and,
16 percent of the imports. Some 35 percent of all the transfers were fi
nanced through private channels, mostly in the form of suppliers' credits,
and the remaining 65 percent were public transfers.
During the years of plan implementation resource transfers to the
Turkish economy from external sources has continued in increased amounts,
even though they fell short of the projected levels. The size of these
transfers has already been discussed in connection with the domestic
resource mobilization.

It is important to note here though, that during

these years, the practice of borrowing through suppliers' credits and
commercial channels was

discontinued. Turkey has borrowed mainly through

-soa Consortium made up of 14 countries led by the United States and Western
Germany.

The Consortium credits have averaged 250 million dollars annually,

some 50 percent of these were in terms of program assistance, 20 percent
was debt relief andthe remaining 30 percent were tied to various projects.
The majority of these credits was tied to the country of origin, carrying
on the average a little less than 4 percent rate of interest
20 years of maturity and some grace period.

with over

6

As a result of this heavy borrowing Turkey has accumulated a relative
ly large external debt, reaching approximately 2 billion dollars by the end

of the sixties.

Servicing of the external debt has been about 20 percent

of Turkey's export earnings.
In Turkey's FFYP, the target year for reaching viability was envisaged
to be around 1978; the end of the Third Plan period.

The possibility of

accomplishing a viable economy by the end of the Second Plan was also men
tioned. The SFYP made the target date more specific, calling for a
economy by the end of 1975.

11

viable"

However, both Plans specified that beyond

the date of viability Turkey would continue to be an importer of capital
either in terms of foreign private investments or commercial credits. Also,
the achievement of this target was stated

to be dependent upon the condition

of Turkey's reaching planned investment and output targets, which in turn
necessitated an uninterrupted inflow of external credits on specified
terms and quantities throughout the Plan implementation.
6. B. Tuncer, "An Overview of the External Financing l1echanism of
the Turkish Economy, 11 The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,
1967, Ankara 1970, p. 3.

-51One of the preconditio ns of achieving viability in any economy is to
generate domestic savings at levels necessitate d by investments which in
turn is determined by the desired rate of gross national product growth
and/or employment levels. Thus in order to reach the stage of self-sus
tained economic growth by 1975, the so-called "savings gap" of the Turkish
economy, which has been persistent throughout the last two decades, needs
to be closed within the next five years.
The performance of the

Turkish economy in terms· of raising the level

of domestic savings has been discussed elsewhere :!n this paper. Here an
assessment of the realism of this target and the pro.spects for achieving
it will be made, in view of the plan implementat ion and recent development s.
Table 12
Saving Gap in the Turkish Economy
(In Percentages )
Plan Targets
1967

1972

196 7-63
Average

1970-68
Average

1975

22. 7

18.5

21.6

25.2

Gross Investment/
19.9

GNP

Implicit
Incremental
c/o Ratio

2.84

24.3

3.47

3.24

Domestic Savings/
GNP

Source:

2.76

3.66

3.60

17.9

22.6

20.8

16.57

19.5

25.2

2.0

1. 7

1.9

1.9

2.1

o.o

External Savings/
GNP

Actual

1968-72
Average

SFYP and 1971 Annual Programs.

-52Table 12 illustra tes the nature of the problem and the size of the
required effort. As can be seen from the table, in order to elimina te the
externa l saving requirem ents by 1975, approxim ately 25% of the gross nationa l
product will have to be saved in that year.

At present , the average saving

ratio is 19.5%. Raising the average savings from about one fifth of the GNP
to one fourth implies nearly a 40% margina l saving ratio. Despite some
commendable efforts in the area of taxation , the margina l savings ratio has
been around 30 percent during the plan impleme ntation and, given the present
policie s, raising the domestic savings to required levels by 1975 seems
unlikely .
On the other hand, recent trends indicate that there is room for lower
ing the saving requirem ents from the levels indicate d in Table 12.

In re

eent years the increme ntal capital output ratio seems to be growing without
justific ation. A better utilizat ion of the existing capacity should lower the
need for addition al savings. Thus it can be argued that as far as the saving
requirem ents are concerne d, the Turkish economy could accompl ish self-su s
tained growth at around 7 percent ;_~Hough a conscien tious policy of both
increasi ng savings and making better use of existing producti on capacity ,
probably not in 1975 but within a decade.

Neverth eless, the present trends

do not warrant this optimism .
The second broadly accepted prerequ isite of achievin g viabilit y is to re
move the balance of payments deficit or at least to reduce it to managea ble
levels through foreign investm ents and/or commerc ial credits.
r.

This can be

achieved on one hand through increasi ng the exports and other foreign

-53exchange earnings at a rapid pace, and lowering the rate of growth of im
ports and other foreign exchange spending on the other. Turkish plans
relied on both courses of action, the FFYP leaning more heavily on import
substitution measures, and the SFYP emphasizing the importance of export
promotion.
In Tablet the balance of current account of the balance of payments
is reconstructed in terms of plan targets and actual realization.
Table 13
Balance of Current Accounts
(in million U.S. $)
Planned

Actual
1967

1968-72
Annual
Average

Pla!lned
1968-70
Annual
Average

Actual
1968-70 1970
Annual
Average

_&.~1

a11Jl

Average

Average

Balance of Trade

-241

-189

-162

-350

-327

-395

-294

-350

Imports

-641

-640

-685

-973

-903

-1.115

-833

-935

Exports

400

451

523

623

577

720

539

585

- 61

6

34

118

97

159

61

103

4

-13

-14

29

9

70

5

-2

57

93

157

150

170

159

230

Invisibles (of which)
Tourism
Workers
remittances

1972

Infrastructure and
Off-share

51

26

14

12

13

10

9

10

Balance of Current
Accounts

-249

-157

-114

-220

-216

-226

-224

-237

Source:

FFYP, SFYP, and 1971 Annual Program

-54At the end of fi.ve years of FFYP implementation the total current
account deficit was considerably smaller than the deficit envisaged in
the Plan. During this period exports grew at a faster pace than projected
while import projections were fully realized.

But the factor that contri

buted most to the improvement of balance of current accounts was the 287
million dollars worth of remittances from the Turkish workers in Western
Europe, during the FFYP period. This was a totally unexpected development
and FFYP had made no provisions for this possibility.

However, the, expected

improvements were not realized in tourism earnings and this item continued
to give a net deficit throughout the period.
For the SFYP period, during the first three years of implementation,
imports, exports and invisible earnings have been running behind the tar
get, although not by a very wide margin. This is not very surprising, con
sidering the relatively lower level of economic activity as evidence by
sectoral growth rates.
In view of these developments the prospects for closing the so-called
"balance of payments gap··, are not encouraging. Even in the SFYP, the current
account deficit was expected to be on the order of 226 million dollars.
This does not reflect an improvement over the actual size of the deficit
during the previous decade. Thus at the outset the SFYP was.net realistic
to assume that the current account deficit would disappear or get significant
ly smaller by 1975.

Currently the current account deficit is running

slightly higher than SFYP projections for the same years, and :it is likely
that by 1972 it will be larger than originally expected.

-55In discussing the viability issue. one has to consider also the repay
ment of external debt.

So, what actually determines the true size of the

external deficit is the current account deficit on one hand and
installment on the existing debt. As already

the yearly

mentioned Turkey's outstand

ing external public debt is around 2 billion dollars. Annual payments for the
amortization of this debt is scheduled to be around 85 million dollars
through 1975.

7

These statistics indicate that the Turkish economy's reaching self
sustained growth at 7% by mid-1970's, is extremely unlikely if not totally
impossible.

It is yet early to judge the impact of recent devaluation on

the balance of pay.ments but.it would be unrealistic to expect devaluation
alone to change the overall picture.

On the other hand, Turkey's resort

ing to credits on commercial terms on a large scale and as early as by 1975
may aggravate the present problems associated with external payments situa
tion.
As far as the viability target is concerned, Turkish planning has not
been very successful. This conclusion is more obvious in view of the fact
that the workers' remittances have helped considerably in lowering the

A

foreign exchange deficit; this has beerydevelopment vn,ich has had no direct
connection with planning as such.

7. By definition, this figure does not include interest payments~
which is another 45 million dollars annually.
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Income Distribution

As stated earlier, one of the more explicit objectives of Turkey's de

velopment plans has been to reduce the existing disparities in personal
and regional income distribution. Even though studies showing the exact
nature and extent of the imbalance are scarce, the discrepancy in the levels
of living is obvious.
A study conducted by the SPO

revealed that in 1963, 20 percent of the

families which made up the lowest income group had a share of 4.5 percent of the national income, while the highest 20 percent income group
shared 57 percent.

On the other hand, per family income in the first group

was approximately 278 dollars, but 3,544 dollars in the latter group. 8
In dealing with the problem of income distribution, planning documents
suggested that the overall government policies should be in line with
achieving a more just distribution. Tax policy would be altered to favor
the poor; prices of basic commodities would be kept in line with the pur
chasing power of the lower income groups; and, education, health and other
services would be extended to the underprivileged in increased quantity and
quality.
In a study carried out by J. L. Enos,

9

of income from 1962 to 1966 was calculated.

the change on the distribution
In this study Turkey's popula-

tion is divided into six socio-economic groups:

low income agriculture,

middle income agriculture, high incorreagriculture, wages and salary earners,
civil servants, and entrepreneurs.

The study reveals that the share of

8.

SFYP,

9.

K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos, Planning Development, Addison and
Wesley, Oxford, London 1971.

.2.E_.

cit. , p. 63.

-57the agricu ltural groups in the nation al income has fallen relativ e to that
of non-ag ricultu ral groups , between 1962 and 1966.

The combined share of

the low income groups in the nation al income has also fallen, while the
share of the middle income groups has stayed more or less constan t and
that of high income groups , made up of entrepr eneurs and high income agri
cultur al group, has increas ed. The study also shows that the share of tax
in
burden of the low income groups has increas ed while the middle and high
come groups has paid relativ ely less taxes, from 1962 to 1966.
Even though it is not possib le to quantif y the changes in the distri
bution of income through 1970, these limited studie s, and observ ations such
es
as the worsen ing of the unempioyment, and the nature of variou s tax measur
indica te that the distrib ution of income has not improved and more likely
has worsen ed during the plan period .
On

the other hand, there has always been a marked differe nce in the

level of living betwee n the large cities and rural areas on one hand, and
the
betwee n the Western and Coasta l provin ces, and the Eastern provinc es on
and
other. Turkey 's five year plans stated reducin g the region al imbalan ces
aiecele rating the develop ment of backwa rd region s, as a priorit y target.
Despite the recog~ ition of the problem and express ed intenti on to
correc t the situati on, the policie s that were formul ated were vague.

Plans

that priorit y would be given to the- backwa rd regions in terms of
sugges ted
..
economic and social infrast ructur e projec ts. For the produc tive investm ents
t
of the public sector , these areas would have priorit y if a certain projec
.
was equally profita ble in both more and less develop ed parts of the country
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This latter policy had very little chance for application, since the back
ward regions had a clear disadvantage from the point of view of resource
endowment and marketing. Also, for the same reasons, various types of in
centives for the private sector to attract their investments to Eastern
provinces, proved to be ineffective.

In addition to these measures, em

phasis was also given in the SFYP to certain projects such as animal hus
bandry, that seemed to be suited to exploit the local resource endowment.
A recent study conducted in the State Planning Organization to deter
mine the socio-economic development of various regions in Turkey, revealed
that in 1963, a composite index for development was 47 for the so-called
20 less developed provinces in the East, against an average of 100 for the
whole country.

10

From 1963 to 1968, the index showed a value of 65 for

the same 20 provinces, while it was 138 for the country as a whole. This
implies that the rate of socio-economic development of the less developed
region was equal to the change in the country and thus there was no rela
tive improvement for the poor provinces.

On the other hand per capita public

investments made in the 1963-67 period was relatively lower in less developed
provinces, particularly if Keban hydro-electric project is excluded because its impact will be more on the Was tern part of the country. Statistics
also show that savings and skilled labor have continued to move from less
to more developed regions in recent years.

10. Socio-economic Development Index for Turkey on a Provincial
Basis, SPO, June 1970 (Mimeographed).
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Price Stability

The damaging economic, social, and political effects of inflation in
the 1950's have made the policy makers very wary of price increases, and
the maintenance of relative price stability has been an overriding concern
of the governments in Turkey.
Several price indices are available in Turkey, but they are usually
considered to be inadequate in reflecting the actual price changes, mainly
Given this note of precaution, the official

because of their coverage.

indices indicate no marked price instability in the economy since the be
ginning of plan implementation in 1963.

The wholesale price index showed an

average 5.2 percent annual increase during the FFYP implementation, and it
was averaging 7 percent in the SFYP period.

The cost of living indices for

two major cities indicated 5 and 8 percent increases for the FFYP and SFYP
. l y. 11
perid
o s, respective

As can be seen, these indices also indicate that

the price increases gained some momentum

in

the SFYP years, compared with

the earlier years of plan implementation.
I.

Reform and Reorganization

Development planning, by definition involves a deliberate attempt to
change the existing socio-economic structure, with a view to speeding up
the rate of economic growth and to distributing the fruits of development
in a more egalitarian manner.

Implicit in

these prepositions is the assump

tion that certain institutions and the present organization of production
11.

1971 Annual Program, ..2£.· cit., p. 33.

-60stand on the way of achieving these broad developmental goals. Development
plans often carry measures to deal with these barriers in

a straightforward

However, the implementation of such measures is not an easy matter,

way.

since any drastic change in the existing order meets with resistance of those
groups who sense that their power and/or benefits will be impaired.

Needless

to say, these are the groups who carry weight in the politics of a country
and thus exercise strong power over the governments.
Turkey's FFYP identified four major areas where reform and reorganiza
tion were urgently needed.

These were land reform, tax reform" reform and

reorganization of the State Economic Enterprises (SEE), and reform in the
administration.
Land Reform: Land reform finds its expression in Turkey's 1961 Constitution
as well as in the FFYP and in the annual programs through 1966, as a measure
to promote social justice and increase productivity in the agricultural
sector. An earlier attempt for land reform in Turkey was made in 1945, but
it did not go beyond the distribution of some land that belonged to the
State.
The attempts for a genuine land reform in Turkey, have always run into
two basic problems. As expected, one problem was the usual resistance on
the part of large landowners and the city dwelling absentee owners, a point
that does not need much elaboration.

The second problem was the lack of

cadastral records establishing the boundaries of present land holdings as
well as basic information and studies necessary for an effective reform.
Those who opposed the land reform have successfully used this latter point as
their strongest argument.
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grounds that it was essential toincreasing yields in agriculture because the
present land tenure was a source of inefficient farming. Land reform was de
fined not only in terms of distribution of large holdings, but also as a
series of measures, including the consolidation of the fragmented plots,
tooling of the farmers, and reorganizing the agricultural credits as well
as encouraging the agricultural cooperatives.
Despite these pronounced policies, the governments did not take any
serious action for a land reform, save a reform bill that was brought to
the Parliament in 1965.

Soon after this, there was a change in the govern

ment and the issue has laid dormant since then.

In fact, in the official

documents the term land reform was omitted, and

in the SFYP an

11

agricul

tural reform 11 on very general terms was proposed.
Tax Reform: As stated in the planning documents, a reform in the tax system
was expected to serve more than one purpose.

It 1:-1as to increase the govern

ment revenues, help improve the income distribution, and induce the private
sector to invest according to the plan objectives. It was also suggested
that improvement was

1c>

needed in the field of tax administration...,;i,fr increase

the tax yields from the present system, mainly through more effective audit

ing.
During the years of plan implementation, several changes were made in
the tax system, basically with a view to increase revenue. These measures
were taken under pressure and were aimed at covering the immediate budgetary
deficits.

For example the rates on excise taxes were increased several times.

-62,
Thus, the share of indire ct taxes within the total rose substa ntially
despite the opposi te policy intenti ons mention ed in the plans, more than
likely contrib uting to the worsen ing of the distrib ution of income .
1
s
Attemp ts to change the tax system in the 1960 s were relativ ely succes

add
ful only from the revenue raising point of view; measur es which might

&-tox A.l'k)l)ft)

on
up tojhave yet to be attemp ted. The criticis ms of the presen t system
ground s that it is not suffici ently elastic , that it does not proper ly
discour age evasion , that large incomes particu larly in ~icul ture are
left outside the system , that it discrim inates agains t the wage and salary
earner s, and that it disrega rds the incenti ves in the private sector ,
continu e to be valid.
Reform and Reorga nizatio n of the State Economic Enterp rises (SEE): The
Enter
issue concern ing the reform and reorga nizatio n of the State Economic
prises has ideolo gical overton es as well as being vitally importa nt on
tic
econom ic ground s. State-o wned enterp rises, conceiv ed basica lly for pragma
the
purpos es, have played a signifi cant role in Turkey 's develop ment since
1930's , their activi ties ranging from manufa cturing and mining to power,
transp ort, and banking service s.

In the past their investm ent, employm ent

criteri a,
and pricing policie s have been affecte d not only by purely econom ic
inbut also social consid eration s such as providi ng employ ment, relativ ely
of less
expens ive goods and service s for lower income groups and develop ment
develop ed regions .
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.pand and divers& their activities, they were also subjected to considerable
bureaucratic control. After a change of government in 1950, non-economic
considerations and political appointment and investments became common
practice.

In the 1950's, while they grew in size, their profits slowly

disappeared. The prices of their products were deliberately held down by
the government in the face of rapidly risin8 general prices. Deficits re
sulting from both their operating losses and haphazard investments were
covered by the Central Bank resources, thus contributing to rapid inflation.
The issues concerning the proper functioning of the SEE became more vital
in the 1960's, when the plan implementation began.

Here were some 130

SEE, absorbing about 35 percent of the investments made by the public sector,
producing nearly half the !ilanufac tu ring output, and providing major services
in the fields of transportation and finance. Moreover, the manufacturing
SEE's activities were concentrated in the heavy industries and in the fields
that provide basic materials for the economy.

Within the framework of the

strategy of mixed economy in the FFYP, the public sector was given the
task of investing in areas where large capital and know-how was re-

quired, thus leading the industrialization process.

All these considerations made the much-needed reorganization of the
SEE a matter of urgency, if they were to perform the functions assigned to
them. Some legislative changes were made in 1964, giving them more autonomy
so that they could concentrate more on efficiency and competitiveness,

-64and also a State Investment Bank was established with the task of closely
scrutinizin g of the investment funds to be channeled to the SEE's.
tion,

a

In addi

Reorganizat ion Committee was formed to evaluate each enterprise

and to reorganize it.

After working continuousl y for four years the Reorgani

zation Committee submitted its reports to the SPO on most of these enter
prises; action has yet to be taken on them.
Meanwhile, the financial status of the SEE has deteriorate d during
the plan period.

The annual programs assigned the SEE the undertaking of

large scale investment projects which forced them to borrow heavily from
the State Investment Bank and also necessitate d large transfers from the
government budget.

Appointment s and promotions according to political

criteria, liberal employment policies, continuous government interferenc e
in pricing and management, the servicing of accumulated debts, combined
with increases in wage payments have all aggravated the problem.
Reform in the Public Administrat ion:

The role of an efficient public ad

ministratio n can hardly be over-emphas ized :Ln carrying out the develop
ment policies. The success of plan implementat ion depends largely on the
proper functioning of the government mechanism.

Fortunately , Turkey has

had an established bureaucrati c mechanism with a long tradition, espec
ially when compared with newly emerging countries.
Nevertheles s, it is equally obvious that an established public admin
istration system does not necessarily have the built-in flexibility to
cope with a rapidly changing socio-econo mic milieu.
efforts require a

Planned development

high degree of cooperation , coordinatio n, control,

-65follow-up and an overall sophistication.

The need for the reorganization

of the administration and administrative practices in Turkey was recognized
even before the FFYP was formulated.

Five year plans and annual programs

have put a special emphasis on the reorganization issue and several ad hoc
committees have studied the case and made reports.

As stated in the 1971

Annual Program, studies still continue and serious measures are yet to be
taken.
The foregoing analysis reveals that either no action has been taken or
the measures fell significantly short of their purpose in areas where some
overwhelming changes had to be made.

Some effects of this may already be

seen, but it would not be wrong to expect that this lack of action will
mostly take its toll in the long run.
IV.

ECONOMIC POLICIES
The foregoing analysis reveals various aspects of the economic policy

formulated and pursued in connection with planning in Turkey.

Here only an

evaluation of the overall economic policy will be made.
In underdeveloped countries some of the institutions that are impor
tant to the proper functioning of a market economy are either non-existent
or are in their infancy.

This is true for Turkey also, where for instance

there is not an organized money or capital market to speak of.

This limits

the choice in the selection of policy instrum~nts and also lowers their
effectiveness.
planning is

On the other hand, in a mixed economy like Turkey, where

only indicative as far as the activities of the private sector

is concerned, the effective use of the economic policy instruments which are
available becomes all the more crucial.

-66It is usually agreed that fiscal policy could have been used with more
effective ness in Turkey, since the governmen t commands a relativel y large
portion of economic resources .

The share of the public expenditu res has

been in the order of 26 percent of the gross national product throughou t the
plan period. As indicated earlier, taxes collected by the governmen t was
15.S percent of the gross national product during the same period. With such
a relativel y high level of public involveme nt, fiscal policy could beef
fective in contribut ing considera bly to the long term developme nt objec
tives. But in Turkey, the short term considera tions of maintaini ng the
economic stability have been a.. ove:cridin g concern of the authoriti es• some
times at the expense of developm ental targets.

It has already been pointed

out that the tax measures were taken mostly with a view to cover the short
term budgetary deficits, The long term developm ental impact of the changes
in the tax system has received little attention .
It is also true that the governmen t expenditu res, and particular ly the
current expenditu res and transfer from the hudget, need to be reviewed
and their actual impact examined in Turkey.

The authoriti es have already

made an attempt to apply the program-b udget system in order to increase
efficienc y, but measures have fallen shol"t of universal applicati on. There
seems to be reason for improveme nt in terms of both quality and quantity
of the services provided by the governmen t, given the present level of
expenditu res.

Governmen t ff:{penditu:r.es could .s.lso be redistrib uted and

scrutiniz ed to better serve the long term developme nt purposes.

-67In terms of maintaining relative price stability while providing the
money demands of a growing output, monetary policy was generally success
ful.

Nevertheless certain aspects of the monetary and credit policies

need improvement.

For instance, the low interest rate policy maintained

by the government seems to have been in conflict with the long term develop
ment policies.

Low interest rates usually discourage voluntary savings

and interferes with the allocation of resources.

The adverse effects of

such policy have already been discussed in connection with industriali
zation and employment.
Other aspects of the monetary and credit policies in the plan period
have drawn criticism.

The increased use of Central Bank credits by the

public sector to cover the deficits of the Treasury, the j_nadequacy

of

institutions that provide medium term credits for the needs of the industry,
the biased distribution of bank credits toward commercial activities at the
expense of industry, and the lack of a properly functioning money market
and a capital market are the areas where changes are in order.
There has not been any major change in the foreign exchange policy
of the government in the plan years until 1970.

The government maintained

a fixed exchange rate of 9 TL= $1 from 1958 until 1970, even though the
Turkish lire was clearly overvalued, particularly during the latter part
of this 12 year period.

In order to control the excess demand for foreign

exchange, originally high tariffs and quantitative restrictions were em
ployed.

In later years the system of deposit requirements were added

to these measures to curb the ever growing demand for foreign exchange.

-68Even though the deposit rates were increased steeply in the last several
years, up to 125 percent, in view of the rapidly depleting reserves, the
transfers of foreign exchange from the Central Bank were held back up to
12 months, sometimes even longer.
The government resorted to certain measures of a de facto devaluation,
by paying premiums to the worker 1 s remittances, tourist purchases and
industrial exports.

Finally, in August, 1970, the Turkish lire was

officially devalued at the rate of 15 TL= 1$.
Since the adverse effects of the maintenance of a grossly overvalued
rate of exchange has already been elaborated on in connection with the
industrialization and employment policies, they need not be discussed here.
But the combined effects of these policies on the overall functioning
of the market mechanism warrants a brief further comment.
Both Turkey 9 s FFYP and SFYP rely heavily on the proper functioning
of the market mechanism for an efficient distribution of scarce resources.
As far as the professed philosophy behind the Turkish planning is concerned,
the government's interference in economic activities has not necessarily
been to replace the market with centralized administrative directives but
rather to remove the imperfections in the market.

The government inter

ference is also expected to promote economic growth through the public
sector's participation in capital formation and encouragement of private
economic activities, as well as to provide a more egaletarian income distri
bution.

-69Some of the economic policies followed by the governmen t, as discussed
above, have been in contradic tion with the expressed intention of the
policy makers in promoting the market mechanism as a resource allocater .
Especiall y the maintenan ce of low fixed interest rates and an overvalue d
currency, coupled with unusually high continuou s protectio n afforded to
industry, have resulted in inefficie nt allocatio n of scarce resources , high
unemploym ent, and internati onally uncompet itive, high cost, small scale
consumer goods industrie s dependent on imports for their raw material or
semi-man ufactured goods.
V.

SUHMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
in the foregoing chapters, an evaluatio n of Turkey's economic develop

ment since the beginning of the plan implemen tation in 1963 and the impact
of the planning on this developme nt has been made.

In summarizi ng the

outcome of this evaluatio n, two points should be remembere d. First, the
time period under study from 1963 to 1970 is a relativel y short one.

It

is always hazardous to measure the impact of planning in such a short per
iod of time, since growth may be affected by external factors and the actual
impact of the changes in economic policy and the investmen ts made in ac
cordance with the plan may take a relativel y long time.

This is all the

more relevant in the case of measures attemptin g to change the socio
economic structure of the society.

Second, the state of statistic s in

Turkey is such that it is difficult even to follow the trends in certain
areas.

Improvem ents are in order in the fields of national accounts, labor

statistic s, price data and the activitie s of the private sector before
detailed analysis with any precision can be made.

-70The official estimates suggest that the total output in Turkey grew
at a relatively higher rate in the plan period compared with the perfor-.
mance of the previous decade, and the average annual rate of growth was not
far from the planned growth rate of 7 percent.

It would not be unrealistic

to assume that planning must have contributed to this development by en
couraging the investments in both the public and private sector, and by
avoiding serious bottlenecks in various inputs and raw materials.

Never

theless, the change in the structure of production has not followed the
pattern envisaged in the deve.lopment plans. The statistics on national
income reveal that the value added in the services sector grew over and
beyond the planned rates wh~le agriculture and industry fell short of
realizing the targets.
Both plans of Turkey c1td not attempt to completely solve the unemploy-

.

ment problem, but they ar·med at easing the problem through providing jobs
at an accelerated rate.

However, the demand for labor increased at only

about 1 percent annually during the plan years. Given an increasing labor
supply of nearly 3 percent annually, both the absolute number of unemployed
and the rate of unemployment have increased. Despite an unprecedented
increase in the demand for T'.1rkish labor from Western Europe, where cur
rently half a million Turks are presently employed, the rate of unemploy
ment rose to more th,m 10 percent in 1970 from less than 8 percent in 1965.
The plan seems

to have made no measurable impact on the employment problem,

and the overall economic policies followed du:ing the plan period have
actually had a depressing effect on employment.
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Another prtority target of the plans, namely achieving a state of
self-sustained economic growth by the mid-1970 1 s, seems to be far from
being realized.

Even though the level of domestic savings increased con-

siderably during the plan years, a viable Turkish economy still requires
a jump in the marginal saving ratio to approximately 40 percent from the
accomplished level of 32 percent.

Serious improvements need to be made

in the organization of the production t1ith a view to increasing the overall
efficiency and a fuller use of eJdsting productive capacity, so that the
capital output ratio and, indirectly, the r,.!quired marginal savings ratio
can be lowered. But the shortage cf foreign exchange presents an even more
formidable problem in reaching self-sustained growth. Export earnings grew
at approximately 6 percent annually, mostly due to an increase in the demand
for Turkey's three traditional export commodities, but the planned efforts
to increase exports of industrial origin have not so far made a tangible
impact.

And again, despite the unexpectedinflow of workers 1 remittances,

which have amounted to more than one third of Turkey's export earnings in
1970, a relatively large current account deficit has persisted. The ser
vicing of a foreign debt of over 2 billion dollars also aggravates the
foreign exchange problem.
Another plan objective, that is, to achieve a more just income distri
bution and to lower the developm2nt gap in various regions of the country
is difficult to evaluate because of lack of data and studies.

Neither

the few studies that are available nor recent developments in employment
in the tax system indicate any improvement in in~ome distribution and
regional balance.
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Successful planning requires both the identification of the bottlenecks
and the obstacles that prevent achievement of certain developmental goals,
and also the formulation of policy measures to remove them. These policies
must be consistent and compatible with the targets as well as with each
other.

Needless to say, the effective implementation of these policies

is the most essential part of the planning process.

The Turkish plans

were basically successful in identifying the major obstacles and the bottle
necks to rapid economic development"
same

But it is not possible to say the

thing for the formulation of economic policies, particularly for the

implementation.

l'.-'.leasures in connection witr.. fiscal and monetary policies

were often taken to correct the short !:e:i:m imbalances without regard for
the long-term development objectives. The maintenance of an overvalued
currency and low interest rates have adversely affected the resource use.
As a result, capital intensive technologies were encouraged at the expense
of employment. Encouragement of import substitution was carried to the
extreme by granting continuous and complete protection to the small-scale,
inefficient industries.

Under this type of protection, consumer good in

dustries which depended heavily on the importation of raw material and
semi-manufactures flourished whereas the industrialization strategy in
the plans called for the expansion of industries that produced intermediate
inputs and capital goo<ls. This type of industrialization discourages the
increases in domestic savings and increases the dependence on imports,
without expanding the export potential of the country.

-73Given the mixed nature of the economy, Turkish planning relied heavily
on the proper functioning of the price mech&nism for an efficient re
source allocation and aimed at removing the imperfections in the market.
However, in implementation, administrative and quantitative controls have
been used extensively to undermine the market.

Particularly in recent

years, these administrative measures were intensified to the extent that
the government transferred funds to firms selected by the State Planning
Organization.
In evaluating the performance of the Turkish economy under planning
and the overall development policien during the plan period, there is
another factor to be borne in mind. That is Turkey's decision to join the
European Economic Community (EEC)~ or as it is more commonly known, the
Common 11arket. Tm:-key was ac~epted by the EEC as an associate member at the
end of 1964.

The association agreement called for a five-year "preparation

periodn during which Turkey was to strengthen her economy and prepare for
full membership.

In 1970, both Turkey and the EEC agreed that Turkey was

ready to enter the second phase, the "transition period," which would last
12 years before full entry, and would require Tnrkey to gradually remove
all restrictions to imports from the six EEC countries within a period
of 22 years.
A full partnership of this nature with the six West European countries
necessitates extensive adjustments in the o~:e;anizat:i.on of production.
Otherwise, the whole Tm~kish ecoT.. omy, and particularly industry• would find

-74competi tion from Estern Europe overwhe lming. Even though the Turkish
economy could not reasonab ly have been expected to overcome the problem s
involved in such an associa tion in a relative ly short period of time, the
crucial years of this ''prepar ation period." could

have been better utilized

with the aid of economic planning . Even some of the more obvious reforms
in the plan documen ts, such as tax reform and the reorgan ization of the
State Economic Enterpr ises, were not attempte d du.ring the plan period.
The foregoin g evaluati on reveals some of the basic weaknes ses and
failures of economic planning i.n Turkey. Despite higher rates of increase
in output in the plan period as compared with the earlier decades , planning
in Turkey fell short of realizin g various targets and the socio-ec onomic
reforms to facilita te long term economi c developm ent.

Neverth eless, cer

1
tain favorab le developm ents did taks place during the 1960 s, which planning

should take credit for.
First of all, planning in Turkey helpecl economic developm ent become
a public issue.

In a aountry which is experim enting with democra tic in

stitutio ns, this is very importa nt.

In Turkey, planning has had an un

deniable educativ e influenc e not only on bureaucr ;:,ts and politici ans, but
also on the Turkish people as a whole, in mdersta nding the problem s
1

associat ed with economic developm ent,
Among other favorab le effects of planning in Turkey, it should also be
emphasi zed that the resource base of the eccorwmy expanded measura bly. The
level of domestic savings increase d botn in absolute terms and as a per
centage of the gross nationa l product. Ther(;! was also a signific ant increase
in the governm ent revenues and particu larly in tax revenue s. Equally
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to invest has improved considerably

in both public and private sectors. At the time the FFYP

went into opera

tion in 1963, there were hardly any large scale projects at hand ready to
be implemented. The absence of well prepared projects slowed down the rates
of implementation in the first two or three

years.

Planning has helped

improve not only the project preparation but also the project implemen
tation skills.

A number of large scale projects in the fields of infra

structure, manufacturing and mining have been conceived and implemented
during the plan period. Even though most of these projects have not yet been
completed, it is expected they ~ill have a stimulating effect in furthering
the industrializati on of the country.
B€tter coordination has been established among various government
agencies since the plan implementation began.

The investment programs of

budgetary agencies and the State Economic Enterprises have been subjected
to close scrutiny and coordination within the State Planning Organization.
The State Economic Enterprises' investment projects have been further examined
by the State Investment Bank when the enterprises applied for credits for
the financing of these projects.

Also, strong coordination between the

State Planning Organization and the :1inistry of Finance. and in some cases
the 1-linistry of Foreign Affairs, has been establ:ished in utilizing the ex
ternal resources and foreign credits.
The existence of a plan has been helpful to the private sector in
Turkey not only on account of the implementation of various promotional
measures, but also because of the information it has provided in the plans
and the annual programs. Entrepreneurs have become more aware of the activi
ties of the public sector in their respective fields as well as the present
productive capacity~ the overall demand, and other relevant information.

-76There have also been some favorable developments in the social field.
For example, with the FFYP a net.,r population policy was adopted repealing
the pronatalist policies hitherto applied.

Legislation was passed expand

ing the social rights of the workers, and providing the right to strike
and collective bargaining.

Even though the targets in education and health

were not fully realized, there has been noticeable improvement in these
fields.
An evaluation of the development of the Turkish economy and the influence
of planning on this development would not be complete without a discussion
of the changes in the socio-economic and political sphere. After all the
effectiveness of planning depends more than anything else on the way it is
implemented. And effective implementation requires a strong political
commitment for economic development and a change in the structure of the
society. Thus economic planning can be an effective and powerful instrument if and only if it is in the hands of those who genuinely use it to
attain self sustained economic development through a change in the existing socio-economic order.
a re-

change in

The government in Turkey, like any other government, is merely a re
flection of the existing power structure. Since planning is a very powerful
and potent instrument, tl:iose wbo have the real power -- customarily called
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new coalition the military still exercised some power indirectly, but the
plan was naturally a compromise.
Turkey had civilian coalition governments until the end of 1965, at
which time the Justice Party came to power.

It claimed to be a descendant

of the Democratic Party whose rule was ended in 1960 by a military revolu
tion after being in power for ten years, and it campaigned on a similar
economic policy platform.

The power centers who supported the new regime

were quite similar to the base on which the old Democratic Party relied,
combining businessmen, small town artisans, and landowners. The new coali
tion was basically conservative with religious overtones, and also enjoyed
the support of the Western European countries and particularly the United
States.

The new coalition made its impact on both the planning process and

the plan organization itself.
cribed above.

The features of this change have been des

But it should be emphasized that within this setup it would

be unrealistic to expect any changes in the nature of reforms that in ef
fect would produce a change in the power structure.
Turkey certainly is not a stagnant society.
increase in the output in the last decades.

There has been an overall

The industrial labor is growing,

there is continuous migration to the cities, and enrollments in different
levels of schooling are increasing.

Changes of this nature are bound to

make their impact on the existing power structure, not probably at a rapid
pace but at least gradually.

But the reform-minded intelligentsia who

have been entirely left out from the ruling coalition, have been impatient
with the slow rate of the change. Alternatives to the parliamentary democracy
have been increasingly appealing particularly to the students. Hhen legiti

\

mate dissent did not meet with an understanding from the ruling power, it
turned to violence, and for a while 1960 seemed to be repeating itself in
1971.

J

-79In Harch 1971 the armed forces once again interfered, and forced the
Justice Party government to resign.

The military, without taking over

the government, asked Parliament to form a strong non-partisan cabinet that
would stop anarchy and carry out major reforms such as land reform and
educational reform.

The program of the new government calls for a

change in the strategy of economic development, emphasizing the leading
role of the government, with less reliance on private initiative and
particularly on foreign investments, and also outlines the major reforms
to be carried out. The success of this new experiment, needless to say,
will depend upon the cooperation of the parliament and the attitude of the
armed forces.

